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Hypothesis 
In a broad sense, an industrial policy is aimed at influencing the structure of an economy. 
Justin Lin (2010), argues that the best way to upgrade a country’s endowment structure is 
to develop its industries according to the comparative advantages determined by its given 
endowment structure at that time. Then he assumes that the economy would be most 
competitive, the economic surplus predominant, and the capital accumulation and the 
upgrading of factor endowment structure will be the fastest possible. He further proposes 
that the private enterprises should enter industries according to the country’s comparative 
advantages, relative factor prices must fully reflect the relative abundance of those factors 
as prices can only be determined through competition in a ―well-functioning‖ market.  
Therefore, the market should be the basic institution of the economy. The proposed essay 
will conduct a critical analysis of structuralism and industrial policy as propagated within 
the ―New Structural Economics‖ realm as proposed by Justin Lin, a former World Bank 
chief economist. The proposed inquiry would attempt to underline that the Newly 
Industrialised Countries showed that specific institutions have performed a critical role in 
guiding market forces towards industrial development. Notably is the state as an institution 
in its developmental role in guiding economic strategy and industrial policies. Therefore, 
the basic argument is that despite the eminence of the orthodox economic approach and its 
responses to the recent economic crises there are numerous contradictions, including 
weaknesses as advocated by Lin’s approach to developmental issues and the role of 
industrial policy, expressly with regard to the developing world. 
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Chapter 1 
1.0 The concept of industrial policy 
1. Introduction 
The recent global crises have put the agenda of industrial policy on the glare of the 
intellectual publicity. There has been rekindled interest in industrial policy from the 
developing world and the Bretton Woods Institutions largely led by the World Bank since 
last three decades of Washington Consensus debacle. Previously, debates revolved around 
the merits or otherwise of industrial policy. Certainly, most countries that managed to 
catch up with the industrialised, high-income countries are the ones whose governments 
proactively promoted structural changes. Simon Kuznets (1959)
1
 , defined structure as "... 
a relatively coherent framework of interrelated parts, each with a distinctive role but 
harnessed to a set of common goals". Alice Amsden (1982), argues that historical and 
empirical evidence demonstrate that the late catching-up experience of Newly 
Industrialised Countries (―NIC’s‖) was through practical industrial policy measures. 
Accordingly, there is a continuous search for new business models, markets and 
channelling of resources into favourable and socially desirable new activities.  
The foremost aim of the proposed thesis is to provide a critical analysis of new thinking on 
industrial policy by the World Bank as led by Justin Lin and his policy articulation through 
―New Structural Economics‖. The proposition is to challenge and critically review Lin’s 
assertion that countries’ should focus solely on the existing comparative advantage and the 
restrictive role assigned to the state in order to successfully upgrade and competitively 
trade internationally. Furthermore, the assertion that the market is the most efficient way of 
scarce resources allocation, and dependably reflective price mechanism for demand in the 
economy. Also, reflecting on an ever-changing dissonance between the Bank’s 
scholarship, advocacy and policy execution, Ben Fine and David Hall (2011), including 
the role of other international institutions in development. Eventually, proceed to examine 
the functionality of Lin’s recommendations on Africa’s industrial landscape, including 
South Africa’s industrialisation initiatives. 
 
                                                          
1
 Simon Kuznets 1959, on comparative study of economic structure and growth of nations, Johns Hopkins, p 
162. 
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2. Research problem 
―…industrial upgrading and technological advance are best promoted by what I call a 
facilitating state, a state that facilitates the private sector’s ability to exploit the country’s 
areas of comparative advantage… the key is to make use of the country’s current 
comparative advantage not in the factors of production that it may have some day, but in 
the factors of production that it has now‖ (Justin Lin and Ha-Joon Chang debate 2009). 
This excerpt demonstrates the unwavering conviction of the mainstream economic 
thinking on the merits of the outcomes of market efficiency hypothesis and the imposed 
limitations on the activist role of the state. An examination of the past four decades of the 
World Bank position towards industrial policy strategy in the developing economies shows 
that its policies and strategies’ prescription has served a narrow neoliberalism economic 
policy–making at the exclusion of ―other‖ alternatives economic approaches to 
development. The appraisal of the World Bank’s historical restrictive state role, 
macroeconomics policies and together with the liberalisation of markets has been the 
cornerstone of this policy-making approach. The polemic is that this has largely 
constrained the economic advancement of the developing world. The thesis proposes to 
show that Lin’s new structural economics conception of always conforming to 
comparative advantage and market efficiency hypothesis prescripts in resource allocation 
is partly misleading and partly unreasonable, if not misinterpreting historical and empirical 
evidence of pragmatic industrial policy that needs to be adopted in the developing world.  
4. Research aims and objectives  
The primary focus of the research would be a critique of Justin Lin’s (2010) proposition as 
championed through his New Structural Economics as an endorsed conventional view and 
the remedial industrial policy prescriptions for the developing economies. This analysis 
will endeavour to challenge Lin’s assumptions by debunking his propositions and provide 
conceivable alternatives to economic development. Secondly, his supposed theoretical 
innovative ideas on industrial policy and methods that are disseminated partly as part of 
responses to the recent global crisis (2007/8), and the hegemonic nature of the World Bank 
in its policy recommendations, as a policy-maker, lender and the knowledge repository. It 
would further focus on the presumed policy shift since the adoption of Washington 
Consensus and current challenges to orthodox economic model. Finally, explore the 
prospects of alternative paradigms ―post-Washington Consensus‖? 
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5     Research methodology 
Ordinarily, the three foremost purposes of research are to describe, explain, and validate 
findings. These allow imaginative investigation, and the organising of the findings in order 
to fit them with the explanations, and then test or validate those explanations. The 
proposed methodology for this research is a combination of approaches. The approach will 
primarily be qualitative and quantitative as it intends to use specific country-case studies 
and comparative analysis, also historical-descriptive, and the critical-analytical 
approaches, as it attempts to focuses on narrative analysis and interpretation of economic 
development. Critically, to organise facts objectively, and events that reflects an accurate 
historical narrative supported by the meticulous references, including careful juxtaposing 
of information. This can be only possible through conducting a substantial literature 
review, both from national and international journals, articles, as well as select books that 
hold relevance to the proposed research. 
Chapter 2 
2.0 Debates around industrial policy 
2.1 Introduction 
The debates on government failures occupy a prominent position in the literature on 
industrial policy imperatives. The debates outcomes largely determine the form of the 
policy positions adopted. Ostensibly, the 2007/8 financial crisis has challenged the 
conviction that unbridled market mechanism is the answer to humanity’s quest for 
sustainable economic growth, and the eradication of poverty. It underscored that 
unregulated markets are vulnerable to corruption, greed and fragility. As Joseph Stiglitz 
(2011) argues that the global financial crisis has cast doubt over the neoclassical paradigm, 
both in advanced and emerging economies, occasioning rethinking of government 
involvement in promoting particular patterns of production. Some advocates of industrial 
policy claim that the performance of the most dynamic sectors of the economy depended 
on comparative advantages created with government aid. In contrast, others prefer the 
―invisible hand‖ that causes resources to be allocated to the most desirable uses.  
2.2 Approaches to industrial policy  
An industrial policy is any form of selective intervention or government policy that 
attempts to alter the sectoral structure of production toward sectors that are expected to 
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offer better prospects for economic growth than would occur in the absence of such 
intervention in market equilibrium. Since the onset of global economic recession there 
have been varied positions around industrial policy, particularly the proposition that the 
developing economies should conform to their comparative advantage as informed by their 
factor endowments. One could identify two distinct arguments underlying mainstream 
thinking around industrial policy, neoclassical approach and market-friendly, including 
structuralist approach
2
 that hold a divergent view to the two latter approaches, Marcus 
Kurtz and Andrew Schrank, (2007). Ultimately, all have their own inferences of 
interventions necessary to promote industrial development. The categorisation of the 
concept of industrial policy is intertwined with its purpose. Its purpose is undeniably 
contaminated with political and ideological undertones, as debates are largely informed by 
these sympathies.  
Moreover, there are varied definitions, comprehension and description of industrial policy. 
What seems to be cautious consensus is that structural change in the productive structure 
of an economy, including perceived or expectant concomitant positive changes, are 
necessary for economic development. Chalmers Johnson (1984)
3
 posits that the concept of 
structural change should refer to the ―concern with the structure of domestic industry and 
with promoting the structure that enhances the nation's industrial competitiveness.‖ 
Reasonably, the purpose of industrial policy can be described as transformation from low 
to high level of production capability. Implicit from this assertion is that an industrial 
policy involves a level of self-conscious planning. In turn, this has to do with changing 
production patterns, for instance, using of production factors for something that was never 
produced before.  
According to the extreme neoclassical approach, all markets are perfect and any 
intervention is susceptible to distort resource allocation. Meanwhile, the static optimisation 
of resource allocation obtained through the functioning of free markets is assumed to lead 
to the maximisation of growth. In terms of the market-friendly approach, the developing 
countries do experiences market failures. Functional and selective interventions are 
therefore recommended to address them. However, the former is supposed to be feasible 
and desirable, because those failures which point to selective remedies are believed to be 
                                                          
2
 There is plethora of approaches and arguments around the industrial policy, including Marxian approach; 
however, for the purpose of this research no attempt will be made to analyse them all.  
3
 Chalmers Johnson, "Preface," in The Industrial Policy Debate (San Francisco, California: ICS Press, 1984). 
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of insignificant importance for industrial development. The selective interventions are 
supposed to be inherently more costly than the flaws they are supposed to correct. Though 
the market-friendly approach abandons some of the assumptions of the neoclassical 
approach, it acknowledges that factor markets may not operate perfectly, and may call for 
interventions in order to create the human capital base required by industrialisation, but 
these interferences must be market-conforming. 
What is self-evident is that public policy is an essential determinant of economic 
development, and that industrial policy continues to be a necessity. Complementarily, a 
capable state remains the key institution to ensure economic development. The state’s 
decisions shape the institutional framework that conditions economic activity and its 
outcomes. There is recognition that market failures in the coordination of investment 
decisions in an industry might be either due to markets asymmetric information, 
deficiencies in the capital market, economies of scale, or externalities in the creation of 
skills base.  
According to Kenneth Jameson (1986), the Prebisch-Singer structuralist approach holds 
that both functional and selective interventions are needed to promote development, and 
governments are capable of carrying them out. The view is that industrialisation may occur 
in the absence of selective interventions, but its pattern and depth will be affected, as 
economies of developing countries tend to be fragile in most circumstances. Moreover, 
their market failures differ in their incidence and intensity, in different activities, and the 
interventions to correct them must necessarily be selective. The selective approach predicts 
that resource allocation would be sub-optimal and growth would be restricted.  
The distinction between market-friendly and selective interventions is often viewed as 
false dilemma. Some policy analysts contend that there is no economic basis for drawing a 
distinction between functional and selective interventions as any intervention, which 
corrects a market failure is instantly market-friendly. Correspondingly, James Robinson 
(2009) declares that the assertion that the government failures are always worse than 
market failures seems to be based on ideology rather than theory or evidence.  
The basis of the debate is that industrial policy should be based on existing comparative 
advantage with others arguing for an incremental steps to defy that comparative advantage. 
The debate is mostly not about the goal, but the path to that goal. Stiglitz (2011) maintains 
that much of development economics had been viewed as asking how developing countries 
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could successfully transition toward the kinds of market-oriented policy frameworks that 
came to be called ―American style capitalism‖. However, the global financial crisis has 
now raised questions about that model even for developed countries. Dani Rodrik (2007) 
contends that industrial policy has to be tailored for specific institutions considering the 
binding constraints that are peculiar to a given country. This means state involvement, 
even with similar strategies can lead to different patterns of industrial development. 
2.3 Economic patterns and industrial upgrading 
According to the Bretton Woods Institutions, the World Bank’s report (1993) on the East 
Asian miracle was interpreted as a turning point in the debate for industrial policy. It was 
construed as an acknowledgement that Southeast Asian countries  benefited from 
deliberate policy interventions, and their approach to development policy-making was 
therefore ―market conforming‖ rather than ―market defying‖. The ―market conforming‖ 
comparative advantages is argued to have given birth to East Asian miracle, portrayed as 
atypical , and attributed to private-sector led development. This ploy is almost invariably 
used to defend the neoclassical development orthodoxy against radical challenges. In fact, 
World Bank and associated institutions self-contradictorily acknowledges the latent 
efficacy of the institutionally demanding strategies employed by these NIC’s, yet they 
question the model’s social and political feasibility in the rest of the developing world, 
particularly in Africa. Accordingly, market liberalisation is offered as a ―second-best‖ 
alternative, John Page (1994). 
Lin’s approach (2009), attempts to provide guidance on how governments should strive to 
shape the economy in a way that is consistent with its comparative advantage. He writes 
that ―In summary, these severe market failures can provide a rationale for government 
intervention to kick start growth. But what kind of intervention? The key to answering this 
question is recognising that the optimal industrial structure is endogenous to the country’s 
endowment structure, in terms of its relative abundance of labour and skills, capital and 
natural resources. Upgrading the industrial structure requires first upgrading the 
endowment structure, or else the resulting industrial structure will become a drag on 
development. Therefore the government’s role is to make sure that the economy is well 
launched on this endogenous process of upgrading.‖ 
Arguably, in the theoretical structure of an industrial policy, an institution becomes a 
strategic variable, the governance of policy knowledge by the government impact on 
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economic development. Thus, industrial policy should address the problem of businesses 
that deal with industrial activities in newly introduced categories of industry. In other 
words, these amount to an interventionist approach in directing an economic 
developmental path. As Robert Wade (2010), points out that the rapid industrialisation in 
the East Asian countries experienced a rigorous government intervention, and these 
interventions were not aimed at ―making the market work better‖ but on enhancing and 
directing production capacity of firms or industries to accelerate productive diversification 
and upgrading in an economy. According to Stiglitz (2011), some of the critical elements 
of comparative advantage might be domestic, yet a country like Switzerland’ pre-eminence 
in watch-making has little to do with its natural endowment. Consequently, natural 
resource endowments need not provide the basis for explaining patterns of production and 
specialisation. He argues against countries limiting themselves to production patterns 
dictated by endowments, as orthodoxy defines comparative advantage. He reasons that one 
of the critical elements is the endowment of knowledge and entrepreneurship, and 
advocates a policy focus that enhances and shapes those endowments. In summation, he 
contends that even if a government were to want to avoid addressing these issues, it cannot 
because what the government does or does not do has consequences, either positive or 
negative for industrial development. 
Chapter 3 
3.0 Debates around functionality of comparative advantage 
3.1 Introduction 
David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage4 is one of the known economic ideas 
that has achieved widespread acceptance in the economics literary world, including its 
modern forms. Since the eminence of the theory, certain special-case exceptions to the law 
of comparative advantage have been demonstrated such as the Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson 
law of factor proportions, and Jagdish Bhagwati’s ―immiserizing growth‖ (1968)5. The 
principle underlying the idea of Ricardo’s law of comparative advantage is an economic 
law that endeavoured to demonstrate that protectionism is best avoided in a free trade 
regime. It claimed that free trade works even if one trading partner holds an absolute 
                                                          
4
 The principle of comparative advantage was first described by David Ricardo who explained it in his book: 
On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1871), in an example of England and Portugal.  
5
 Jagdish Bhagwati, 1968. Optimal policies and immiserizing growth. Department of Economics, Working 
Paper No. 34. 
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advantage in all areas of production, or produces products cheaper, better and more 
efficiently than its trading partner. 
3.1.2 Law of comparative advantage and terms of trade 
Lin’s proposition is one of the innumerable attempts to demonstrate unfailing relevance of 
comparative advantage. According to him, the best way to upgrade a country’s endowment 
structure is to develop its industries according to the comparative advantages determined 
by its given endowment structure at a particular time. He further argues that an 
identification and prioritisation of new sectors, industry, and of infrastructure investment, 
not only must align with the country’s comparative advantage, but also must have the 
lowest possible transaction-related costs to be competitive in the globalised world. For Lin, 
price competition is the sine qua non of comparative advantage, and therefore proposes 
―getting the prices right‖. He assert that upgrading the industrial structure requires the 
upgrading of the factor endowment structure from one that is relatively abundant in labour 
and natural resources to one that is relatively abundant in capital. Thereafter, an 
introduction of new technologies, and the corresponding improvement in infrastructure to 
facilitate economic operations.  
However, Anwar Shaik (2004) contends that industrialised countries have high level 
technology, often certain abundant natural resources, also high real wages, while most 
developing countries the pattern is generally opposite. Accordingly, bringing in an 
international trade and competition, the developing countries are forced to compete in 
sectors with low wages to derive cost advantages. Dani Rodrik (2011), also criticises the 
idea of strictly adhering to comparative advantage. He submits that, if China with its huge 
surplus of agricultural labour was to specialise in the type of products that its factor 
endowment dictates it would not be economic giant it is today. The same could be argued 
about South Korea; it defied its comparative advantage by moving into heavy and 
chemical industries by means of building specific skills, filling specific gaps in the value 
chain, relying on a select set of business groups and strategic choice. It contradicted the 
often-repeated mantra of focusing on the ―development of industries consistent with latent 
comparative advantages‖. The contention is that comparative advantage and static 
efficiency entailed that South Korea produce rice, certainly it might today been among the 
most efficient rice farmers, but it would still be a poor country.  
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3.1.3 Architecture-based comparative advantage 
Lin’s New Structural Economics places primacy of a country’s resource endowment at the 
centre of its economic development, which he believes should determine the productive 
structure of its economy. The assumption is that the country’s features and industry’s 
characteristic tends to enjoy competitive advantages vis-à-vis trading partners. In 
accordance with the Ricardian theory of comparative advantage, what is implied is that a 
country that has significant endowment of a certain factor of production would have a 
better fit with industries that heavily uses that particular resource, assuming that 
technology is identical across trading countries. However, this theoretical presupposition 
has a difficulty in convincingly explaining, for instance, seemingly enhanced production 
competence of South Korea, Taiwan and China in some technology-intensive products 
such as DRAM, CDs media, and DVDs recorder that were assumed to be Japan’s 
stronghold for many years. 
According to Takahiro Fujimoto (2007), the feasible theoretical framework that best 
explains this incoherence of Ricardian comparative advantage is what he calls 
―architecture-based‖ comparative advantage. Fujimoto describes this as a ―fit between 
organizational capacity and architecture‖. He contends that this framework is the outcome 
of building an organisational capability, which emphasises teamwork among a multi-
skilled work force, an ―integrative organizational capability of manufacturing‖6 that raises 
productivity and quality at the same time. The approach allows economically rational long-
term transactions and employment of labour factor. Fujimoto presents two basic types of 
product process architecture, namely, integral architecture and modular architecture. The 
former necessitates complex interdependence between product functions and product 
structure such as automobiles, while the latter outlines a relationship between a product’s 
functionality and structural elements with a simple one-to-one correspondence such as 
personal computers.  
Elucidating that further, he declares that the essence of the architecture-based comparative 
advantage is informed by particularistic organisational capability, which is informed by 
initial capability-building process that generates region specific-specific capability. 
According to this framework, owing to its socio-historical circumstances, United States 
                                                          
6
 Early post-war years the Japanese manufacturing firms used this approach while experiencing high 
economic growth amid shortages of work force. Toyota Production System is a typical example of such 
capability. 
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companies show comparative advantage in technology-intensive modular architecture 
goods, while China and other South-eastern Asian countries are leading in modular 
manufacturing, because they have been functioning as production bases of Japan and 
Western multinationals, and have thus exhibited labour-intensive integral architecture 
goods. Therefore, the latter countries trained a multi-skilled work force to enhance their 
competitiveness and structural upgrading in manufacturing integral goods for export 
purposes.  
Fujimoto claims that products with certain type of product process architecture tend to tie 
better with a particular type of organisational capability causing high productivity 
performance in terms of productivity, lead time and quality. This is a significant departure 
from Ricardian-Lin’s generic theory of comparative advantage that emphasises the 
primacy of natural endowment and market determinism, which Fujimoto contest do not 
reflect the reality of trade dynamics. He avers that the Ricardian classical version might be 
empirically valid, but does not adequately explain why comparative productivity 
advantages occur in certain industries only. This is analogous to Marshall’s sentiments 
that, (1885, p.159) an economic theory is ―not a body of concrete truth, but an engine for 
the discovery of concrete truth‖. He goes further to state that it provides a ―systematic and 
organized methods of reasoning [p.164] and an account of ―manners of action of causes‖ 
[p.171]
7
 . 
Chapter 4 
4.1 Introduction 
4.0 Defining the role of activist state 
One of the fascinating aspects of industrial policy has been the disagreement about the role 
of the state in promoting the process of structural change in the economy. Received theory 
is of the view that most market failures are the consequence of government interference, 
and that the welfare cost of government remedial intervention invariably outweighs the 
welfare gains. Hence, the age-old debate over the relative roles of the markets and the 
state, and the criticism of the notion of a developmental state. Countries’ developmental 
potentials for economic advancement and industrial upgrading, as well as, survival in any 
                                                          
7
 Cited from Kevin Hoover, The Past as the Future, the Marshallian Approach to Post Walrasian 
Macroeconomic, Beyond the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model, edited by David Colander. 
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competitive market depend on the ability to create and implement effective and efficient 
policies and strategies. The critical part is the institutions bestowed with the 
responsibilities of implementing the requisite policy instruments to realise the 
developmental goals. It is often argued that in the past, the developing country’s states 
have been inhibited as agents of development. Therefore, the question to pose is how the 
state can be reconstructed and its role re-defined?  
4.1.1  Evolving character of the state in economic development 
Industrial policy certainly implies state involvement in economic activities. Yet, there is no 
uniformity on the scale of the involvement. The extent of the government role varies from 
one country to another, and it could be generally described and divided into two major 
categories. Firstly, facilitator state, where the state plays the role of a facilitator, is setting 
conducive rules of the economic activities to encourage economic development in a 
particular direction. For example, to limit import competition, it may use import tariffs and 
quotas boosting domestic producers’ competitiveness through subsidies, either directly 
through tax rebates, and/or indirectly through research and development funds. Investment 
incentives, such as tax breaks or cheap land, may be offered to promote production in 
certain sectors. Secondly, the entrepreneurial state refers to the state’s role as an 
entrepreneur. This could be in the form of State-Owned Enterprises (―SOE‖) shaping and 
influencing production decisions planned. These enterprises can be wholly-owned by the 
state or joint-ventures between the state and multinational or private enterprises. State 
entrepreneurship is a vertical expansion of government control on economic activities. 
This type of state role was widespread in the developing economies during the height of 
import-substitution industrialisation. Lin advocates the former. 
He believes that every developing country has the potential to grow at 8% (per cent) or 
more continuously for several decades, and become a middle-income or even a high-
income country within the span of one or two generations. This is on condition that 
governments have the ―appropriate‖ policy framework to facilitate the private-sector led 
development, including exploitation of countries latecomer's advantages. He cautions 
against defying comparative advantage as he believes country’s factor endowments should 
be priorities over everything else and ultimately allow the allocative efficiency of market 
determination. There seems to be tenacious aversion to state involvement in managing 
industrial development as there is ingrained belief that the risks and outcomes are almost if 
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not always result in monumental distortions and failure. Lin (ibid) opines ―…industrial 
upgrading and technological advance are best promoted by what I call a facilitating state, a 
state that facilitates the private sector’s ability to exploit the country’s areas of comparative 
advantage…‖ (Lin and Chang debate, 2009).  
Alice Amsden (2002) credibly shows an evidence of countries that undertook ambitious 
projects and managed to successfully break the old barriers, defy established conventions 
and comparative advantages injunctions and became industrialised, even become 
successful global leaders in new lines of business, sectors and industries. This is 
recognition of markets inadequacy and co-ordination challenges that create market 
imperfections. However, this recognition has a few, if any concrete implications for 
consensus for policy-making course. For instance, the neo-liberal approach acknowledges 
the causal link of failing economic performance due to market and institutional 
imperfections, but proposes a policy intrusion that addresses these imperfections in a 
piecemeal manner or development of industries that depend on an underlying comparative 
advantage, Lin and Celestin Monga, (2011). Ha-Joon Chang (2011), cites two key reasons 
for the controversies and confusion about industrial policy in developing countries. First, 
he points out that antagonists of state activism tend to focus attention on the failed policies 
implemented overlooking the objectives and the broader strategic choices made in the 
successful cases. Second, he claims that almost always different types of government 
interventions are lumped together in regression analyses, with little consideration to which 
ones may have attempted to facilitate the emergence of industries that are consistent with 
latent comparative advantage.  
Romer (2011) suggests that ―the challenge is to find better forms of government 
intervention, ones that have better economic effects and pose fewer political and 
institutional risks‖.8 He cautions that there is tendency for economists to invariably avoid 
to address the unpredictable political and institutional factors, which emerges during 
analytical undertaking and instead they work backward from a desired policy outcomes to 
a simple economic model that supports it. While, Stiglitz (2011), contends that there is 
probably no country that has developed successfully without an important role, not just in 
restraining and creating markets, but also in promoting industrial policies, during its 
developmental stages, not even today. He urges for the adoption of policies and practices 
                                                          
8
 Citation from The Authors 2011. Development Policy Review, 2011 Overseas Development Institute. 
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that create effective state associated institutions that would enhance the quality and 
efficiency of the public sector, as successful countries did.  
He further notes that policies that either intentionally or unintentionally weaken the state 
are not likely to succeed as economic policies have to reflect the capacity of the state to 
implement them. Although the interventions will never be perfect, nor need they be to 
effect an improvement in economic performance, as the choice is not between an imperfect 
government and a perfect market, is rather between imperfect governments and imperfect 
markets, each of which has to serve as a restrain on the other. They need to be perceived as 
complementary, and seek a balance between the two, balance which is not just a matter of 
assigning certain tasks to one, and others to the other, but rather designing systems where 
they relate effectively. The definitive point is that the markets do not come into existence 
on their own, and neither contention is about less or more roles for either. Unlike 
mainstream view, which continues to control development policy frameworks, and 
underpinned by dichotomies like import-substitution versus export orientation, public 
versus private with virtues on its side and vices on the other. The developing country’s 
state or state-led institutions are perceived to be worse than ―state-in-general‖, so the 
attitude is, it should be restrained as much as possible by private markets, Robert Wade 
(2010). 
4.1.2 Theories of state interventions 
The state is more than the custodian of the rule of law, but also a critical institution in 
influencing country’s political economy. Douglas North (1994) defines institutions as 
structures that shape political, social and economic interaction, with policy choices made 
within socio-political parameters of the institution. The dominant discourse in the state 
intervention is the view that its interference in the economy is a negative and market-
distorting exercise. The historical prevalence of authoritarian regimes, in a number of 
developing economies lent credence to the Washington Consensus focus on policy reforms 
that diminishes government participation. Yet, there is increasing recognition that market 
liberalisation requires a capable state to provide more than legal security and a certain 
level of regulation to ensure competition. Lin (2011) alludes to a ―long list‖ of failed 
attempts to ―pick winners‖, and these failures were often the consequence of the 
governments’ inability to design good criteria for identifying industries that are worthy of 
state assistance. In fact, he argues that governments' propensity to target industries that are 
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too ambitious and not aligned with a country's comparative advantage largely explains 
why their attempts to ―pick winners‖ resulted in ―pick losers‖.  
He postulate that ―…the key is to make use of the country’s current comparative advantage 
not in the factors of production that it may have some day, but in the factors of production 
that it has now‖. Although Lin concedes a certain role for state in economic development, 
including industrial policy, but reasons that comparative advantage defying policies will 
certainly fail because they will be expensive for government, even for the private sector. 
Additionally, he recognises the fact that there are countries that have in the past defied 
comparative advantage with activist state, and became remarkably successful. For 
example, South Korea started to produce steel when its per capita income was low 
compared to that of United States, and against the advice of World Bank. Yet it became 
one of the most efficient steel manufacturers in the world. Even so, inferences from his 
recommendations is that developing economies should align their trade with their resource 
endowment in order to benefit from global trade and finance, by implication the optimal 
developmental strategy is free trade and comparative advantage prescripts.  
According to Jennifer Bair (2005), the remarkable trajectory of East Asia’s export-oriented 
economies was interpreted as evidence that integration into global economy is the only 
option for developing economies to pursue. This conclusion seemed valid when this 
success was contrasted with the disappointing economic performance of state-led 
industrialisation models of several developing nations that were in debt during the ―lost 
decade‖. Conveniently, recognition of government failures has been indiscriminately used 
to override any argument for the need for the state to address any market failures. Any 
model’s elaboration suggesting the need for state intrusion or explicitly drawing the state 
interventionist implications from its analysis in light of market defects, the strategic 
implications of the model is negated by arguing against the state involvement, since the 
conjecture is that the outcomes of government failure would be inferior to that of market 
failure. 
Peter Townsend (2002) remarkably illuminates the unavoidability of state participation in 
influencing economic direction and participation in the economy owing to assumed 
causality of market imperfections. He declares that governments are bound to contribute to 
the elaboration of institutional frameworks of demand. He suggests that private citizens 
and by implication the private enterprises, in times of economic crisis, did not, and could 
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not be expected to act in the national interest. Correspondingly, neither government should 
shirk its responsibility for the shaping the market demand or developing the structure of 
the market itself. Therefore, they could not imagine being indifferent during the times of 
economic convulsion. In Townsend’s account, complex economies could not be conceived 
without governments being incorporated as a structural assumption. In his own words 
―They were, and are, a necessary condition and determinant of operating markets‖. The 
private enterprises have a distinguished reputation for risk-averse attitude and preference 
for investment in promising profit from short-term speculative economic activities. 
Predictably, profit motive compels their reluctance to invest in economic activities that 
have socially optimal outcomes with uncertain profitability. Likewise, Ben Fine (2011) 
decries the hypocrisy of neo-liberalism’s scholarship and rhetoric against state 
intervention. He argues that there has been mediation to promote private capital in general 
and finance in particular, and that the recent global recession (2007/8) is not the exception 
where extraordinary measures have been undertaken to bail-out financial institutions, by 
the state backed by taxpayers’ money, to the degree of nationalising those institutions. 
4.1.3 The capital flows and state functionality 
Laurence Krause (1972), [cited by Conrad Herold, 2002] delineated on how capital 
mobility reduces governmental discretion. In his own words: ―Private capital flows can 
have a great influence on domestic economic conditions and the balance-of-payments 
positions of countries, possibly undermining governmental policies…the private sector has 
encroached on governmental sovereignty in financial markets...‖ According to Herold, 
capital account liberalisation serves as a disciplinary device against national governments. 
On the negative outcomes of the capital flows he stated ―… the immediate beneficiaries, 
the bankers and financiers that profit from the unleashing of speculative flows, what 
Jagdish Bhagwati called the ―Wall Street-Treasury complex,‖ are both few and powerful.  
Louis Pauly (1996) notes that ―…the logic of markets is borderless, but the logic of 
politics remains bounded‖. On the other hand, Susan Strange (1996) writes ―Impersonal 
forces of world markets…are now more powerful than the states to whom ultimate 
political authority over society and economy is supposed to belong‖. According to Strange 
the transition in the state-market balance of power, which is driven by globalisation, is 
virtually overwhelming. Her point is that this change is intensely driving market structures 
to limit the conditions under which states could exercise a significant influence over 
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outcomes that matters most to the societal welfare. Though she concedes that other 
institutions have had a role in shaping the structure of political economy, the prevailing 
global forces have contributed to the weakening of the state as the centre of political 
influence and authority.  
Strange contends that the evidence of the shift from the states to markets is manifest in a 
number of areas, such as the latter’s participation in the ownership and control over 
industry and services, states inability to manipulate macroeconomics, provision of reliable 
social welfare systems and taxation of highly mobile capital offered as evidence. However, 
Pauly’s assertion is that the perceived state weakening and crisis of legitimacy is the 
consequence of its own choices and decisions. He points out that states want to gain the 
advantages of integrated international markets, yet retain the authority and influence that is 
supposed to be weakened by the same assimilated global markets. In verbatim, he argues 
that ―The closer we get to a world of a truly global finance the more central they become, 
not because they must inevitably usurp the political authority of states, but because they 
help states address their deepening legitimacy problem‖.  
He claims that states have increasingly opted for openness and integration, as a 
consequence they have had to forfeit either fixed exchange rate or monetary policy ―a 
choice that brought to the fore basic concerns about political legitimacy‖. In contrast, for 
Strange what is perceptible in the shift of balance of power is not necessarily the degree, 
but the implication of resultant policy constraints. A shift from primary production to 
manufacturing and finally to services has diminished the dependence of multi-national 
corporations on the territorial state. Accordingly, the sphere of state’s power and influence 
in society and economy is now lessened and shared with other sources of authority, if not 
appropriated by them. 
4.1.4 Assumed efficacy of market mechanism 
The purposive principle of industrial policy could be likened with the expressive, 
deliberate and targeted efforts to promote some sectors if not production of certain 
products ahead of others in an economy. Chang (2010) writes ―There are different ways to 
organise capitalism. Free-market capitalism is only one of them and not a very good one at 
that. There is no one ideal model.‖ Clearly, there are varying types of ideal economic 
models, which are not just different, but with conflicting goals and priorities. The 
contestation might be about the different ways of organising the markets, and they 
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compete with each other in a number of contexts, not least when the contest is about how 
to secure control of scarce resources in the currently fragile economic world.  
In 2008, when financial markets collapsed, finance capital was able to inflict mayhem as it 
had been placed beyond control by deliberate policies of deregulation in pursuit of a free-
market dogma. As Jeff Guys puts it ―But there is no market out there. What there is, is 
people. Some clever, some stupid, some honest, many dishonest, most greedy, but all 
trapped in the machinery of finance capital and deluded by the free-market ideology of the 
age.‖9 Meanwhile, Gregory Mankiw (2009) had this to write referring to the 2007-8 global 
recession ―Despite the enormity of recent events, the principles of economics are largely 
unchanged … Students still need to learn about … the efficiency properties of market 
outcomes‖10. Seemingly, the insistence to conform to markets serves the purpose of 
validation of capitalists’ accumulation. The orthodox economic paradigm has always 
exhibited less confidence in the ability of the state to be a virtuous instrument of upright 
policy, and enhance the societal welfare. To it the government is a malign tool of private 
interests, enriching its supporters, bureaucrats and cronies, and its role being limited to 
enabling the markets to function optimally.  
4.1.5 Market constraints on industrial evolution 
Developing economies faces several and varying market failures and the nature of these 
failures is not always the same. They depend on each country’s specific objectives with 
regard to the activities it wishes to pursue, and the level of technological competence and 
endogenous innovative capacity it wishes to develop. The need for intervention is 
determined within this context. An industrial development does not only mean embarking 
on new activities as economies progress and mature, this means a deepening of the process 
in some areas of an economy. Amongst other things, the introduction of technological 
improvements in products and processes in industry, embarking on new complex 
productive competencies, and increasing local content in assembly operations are required 
to add-value. Perceptibly, each one of these industrial development activities has its own 
learning costs. Lin (2011) argues that the developing countries should identify the 
industries in which their economies may have a latent comparative advantage and remove 
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binding constraints to facilitate private domestic and foreign firms' entry to operate in 
those industries to minimise costs.  
However, Bernado Kosacoff and Andrian Ramos (1998) contend that the process of 
forming capabilities can come up against various market flaws. For example, with regard 
to products, free markets may not give the right signals for resource allocation, while with 
regard to factor inputs, they may not lead to an optimal supply of inputs, especially in the 
case of skills and information. Added to that free markets may suffer from two different 
types of flaws, namely those that affect optimum allocation of investments between simple 
and complex activities, and those that affect such allocation between physical investments, 
purchase of technology, and domestic technological efforts. The first-named provides the 
arguments in favour of infant industries argument. In view of the uncertainty, the lack of 
information and the imperfections in the capital market which are endemic in the 
developing countries, full exposure to competition from imports can inhibit entry into 
activities involving relatively complex technologies. This is contrary to Lin’s assertion on 
the advantages of developing economies being the late developers or backwardness of 
their economies enabling them to avoid the costs of innovation and learning. 
4.1.6 The role of NGOs in development  
Since the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes (―SAPs‖), and attendant 
challenges in the developing world, the use of Non-Governmental Organisations 
(―NGOs‖) became more popular within multi-national institutions and agencies. The 
popularity was mostly informed by their supposed efficiency in empowering and meeting 
the basic needs of local communities, Geof Wood, (1997). They are perceived as 
representative par excellence of civil societies in the developing world. Within the donor 
community they have become an imperative, a condition of necessity for the developing 
economies. The attachment to their functionality is so strong that it might be perceived to 
border on paternalistic attitude. There is anecdotal evidence that some NGOs play a 
dynamic role in creating eager and participatory civil societies in development activities, 
and thus making development more meaningful.  
On the other end of the ledger, Arturo Escobar (1995) argues that the production and 
dissemination of development knowledge is always top down, from the donor agencies to 
the developing world or local communities. They have a self-assigned authority to 
problematise issues, make client groups, and define strategies. Consequently, bilateral aid 
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agencies and multi-lateral banks have been channelling money directly to NGOs. Even the 
World Bank has used NGOs primarily as implementing agencies or as advising 
consultants. The World Bank and the associated multi-national donor agencies have 
increasingly turned their attention to more than developmental concerns to include the 
democratisation ideals and ―popular participation‖. On the other hand, the contradictory 
view is that the growing and deepening relationship between the NGOs and international 
governmental organisations in the developing countries pose a moral dilemma as the 
promotion of effective development has a potential conflict with respect for state 
sovereignty in those countries, David Hulme and Michael Edwards, (1998).  
Any dubious liaison of NGOs involved in development projects with the intentions of 
manipulating domestic politics raises impasses and scepticism. Wood (1997) is cautiously 
optimistic regarding the exaggerated relevance of the NGOs in the developing countries. 
According to him, for the NGOs to operate, for markets to penetrate and hold authority, for 
private enterprises to influence societies effectively, the first thing done is to diminish the 
power and authority of the state by curtailing its role in providing services to its citizenry, 
and by reducing its control on resources. He contends that this is a part of the neo-liberal 
agenda through advocacy of the rhetoric of ―good governance‖ which is paradoxical in 
meaning and operation. He calls this scenario the ―franchise state‖, the state that franchises 
its responsibility to NGOs. 
4.2.1 The discourse of “good governance” in developing economies 
Woods states that ―good governance‖ is explained as ―democratic process with strong 
accountability between state and people, removing the prospects of dictatorial oppressive 
governments and underpinning, therefore, the protection of fundamental human rights‖. He 
reasons that this is nothing, but a developmental ―hypocrisy‖ embodied in the Western 
preoccupation with the theme of ―good governance‖. He contends that the ―good 
governance‖ represents a revival of ethnocentric, modernising ideology, attempting to 
make the myths of one society reality in another. Similar sentiments have been expressed 
about ―eco-protectionism‖ or ―eco-colonialism, Robert Nelson (2003) that is emerging 
under the guise of addressing climate change concerns, particularly from advanced 
countries. The controversy is that ―eco-colonialism‖ is one of the manifestations of neo-
colonialism, in the post-colonial world, which stems from and relates to unequal power 
relationships in the political and economic spheres. Consequently, the industrialised 
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countries’ values about ―the environment‖ are projected onto the developing world, for the 
enjoyment of the new consumer, the tourist.  
For Wood, the thrust of policy is to undermine the monopoly of the state in service 
provision, thus reducing the necessity for government to be good, and good governance is 
not universal, rather relative, and contingent upon cultural expectations and distributional 
outcomes. The central prescription of development strategy of international institutions for 
accelerating economic growth in the developing economies has become the improvement 
of the public administration, which is another euphemism for good governance. As Wade 
(2010) states we can agree that an effective and accountable public administration is 
desirable in itself, but international institutions expound praises of improved governance 
on the basis that improvements contribute to subsequent higher economic growth. Wade 
shows that on this basis the World Bank and IMF have built the governance reforms into 
their lending conditionalities. He further demonstrates that the underbelly of the notion of 
effective public administration is largely derived from the dubious measures, if not 
subjective indicators of administrative performance, as evidence reflects that the causality 
is more from growth to improvements in governance, than the other way around, [Kurtz 
and Schrank, 2007], cited by Wade. 
4.2.2 Policy inconsistency of Bretton Woods Institutions 
United Nations Organisation, since its inception, it has been claimed that its global role has 
been largely undermined by powerful nations. For example, the United States and its 
European allies have demonstrated a capacity to deploy it for their foreign policy 
objectives with impunity. The modern global capitalist accumulation can be argued that is 
anchored on a single pivotal foundation, the two post-war multilateral financial 
institutions, the IMF, and the World Bank. The IMF is charged with the responsibilities of 
supervising global monetary system, such as currency convertibility, exchange rate 
problem, financing problem short-term funding for balance of payments problems. On the 
other hand, the World Bank is charged with the brief of long-term loans for reconstruction 
and development, and knowledge sharing. Notable is that the roles of these two institutions 
have not drastically changed over the past decades. They have continued to feature 
predominantly as major agents of market fundamentalism.
11
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An examination of the World Bank’s history and position towards industrial policy 
strategy shows that its policies and strategies have been advancing neoliberalism economic 
policy–making at the exclusion of ―other‖ alternatives approaches to economic 
development. Its restrictive state role, macroeconomics policies and coerced market 
liberalisation has been the cornerstone of this policy-making approach. This has largely 
limited the policy choices of most developing world, particularly considering the 
conditionality of SAPs. Ben Fine (2000) captures this ambiguity within Bretton Woods 
Institutions succinctly ―…neo-liberalism offers a complex, shifting and contradictory 
amalgam of ideology, scholarship and policy in practice. That such contradictions exist 
should scarcely surprise, and addressing them offers an opportunity to explore the diversity 
associated with neo-liberalism rather than to reject the notion altogether as its 
consequence. Further, this diversity is itself variously distributed across time, place and 
issue...‖  
According to Illene Grabel (2011), World Bank and its representative institutions are 
experiencing what she calls ―production incoherence‖, which she describes as a 
proliferation of inconsistent, even contradictory statements and strategies. She argues that 
the spectrum of responses from the BWIs reflect more of a substantial rhetoric and policy 
continuity with neo-liberalism prescription. She contends that though production 
incoherence has displaced the constraining neo-liberalism, all being the consequence of 
global recession, but she cautions that these do not in any way signal the death-knell of 
neo-liberalism, but merely the erosion of its stronghold. And the tentative beginning of the 
end of wrong-headed policy regimes that bequeathed excessive authority to the Bretton 
Woods Institutions over feasible policy choices in the developing economies, albeit in 
limited sense. 
4.2.3 Multi-national institutions and development discourse 
Economic ideas, like political ideas are not only about creating wealth and development, 
but also about power. Arturo Escobar’s proposition (1992) about the nature and evolution 
of development discourse of the ―underdeveloped‖ world, declares that ―What 
characterizes a discourse such as development is the fact that the regime of formation of 
statements is carefully regulated. In fact, only a relatively limited number of things can be 
said within a given discourse. Once established through theories and institutionalized in 
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practices (...), this set of statements determine what could be said, thought, imagined, it 
defined the space of development…‖  
Compellingly, he outline the complexity and pervasive power of development as discourse 
that creates infinite prescriptions, institutions, and programmes that give an impression of 
an extraordinary learning process and advances. Escobar contends that the ideological 
orientations of development discourse lead to different perspectives. Rather than rejecting 
one and accepting another, he suggests a comprehensive analysis and debate as there is a 
possibility to arrive at a better understanding of the most important concept in a social 
order. He singles out the World Bank as one of the international institutions whose 
plethora of literatures and prescriptions are repetitive and misleadingly profess to be 
universal in orientation, eventually, its received development discourse distorting reality as 
it becomes uncontestable reality. In addition, Escobar (ibid) insists that almost all 
development projects are economics-oriented, as economics has the monopoly of authority 
in the area of development, and subordinates other social science disciplines. Respectively, 
he concedes that there has been a noteworthy shift as other disciplines such as sociology, 
political science, environmental studies have become not only critics but also notable 
contributors to the discourse of development. Accordingly, the area of development has 
become now interdisciplinary in nature.  
He urges that to appreciate the profundity of development as a discourse, examination of 
the system of relations established between the developed world, international institutions, 
and the developing world ―… is a system that allows the systematic creation of objects, 
concepts, and strategies… the system of relations establishes discursive practices that set 
the rule of the game, who can speak, from what point of view, with what authority, and 
according to what criteria of expertise. It sets the rules that must be followed for this or 
that problem, theory, or object to emerge and be named, analyzed, and eventually 
transformed into a policy plan‖.  
Angus Deaton research concluded that (2006) ―The World Development Reports have 
sometimes been instrumental in changing the way that the world thinks about some aspect 
of development …they often seeks to minimize conflict and to emphasize ―win-win‖ 
situations instead of trade-offs. They often lack sharpness and focus, and are sometimes 
incoherent, especially when it proves impossible to reconcile the views of the various 
commentators and authors. …[it] provide the Chief Economist with a highly visible 
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vehicle for summarizing and disseminating research on issues that he or she considers to 
be important…‖  
This largely accounts for an ever-changing dissonance between these institutions’ 
scholarship, advocacy and policy execution, Ben Fine and David Hall (2011). Ajit Singh 
(2011) analysed the evolution of the World Banks’ industrial policy views using its two 
seminal works, the 1991 report ―Developmental Challenge”, and the 1993 report on the 
―East Asian Miracle”. He critiques the negative attitude, which the World Bank has 
always had towards policy measures linked with the industrial policies. He claims that 
there is renewed interest in industrial policy and insistence on developing countries to 
pursue an industrial policy that conform to their current comparative advantage.  
Singh highlights that the Development Challenge report although, even if it recognises the 
effect of the international factors, it downplays their significance and effect, compared to 
domestic policies, especially in raising domestic per capita income. Essentially, Singh 
suggests that the report prescribes the state involvement in a market conforming manner, 
best illustrated in what Lin calls the state provision of ―tangible‖ (roads) and ―intangible‖ 
(education) infrastructures to create suitable environment for private sector to operate 
optimally. On the subject of the 1993 report ―East Asian Miracle‖, Singh argues that even 
though the report concedes the unavoidable fact that there was significant state 
involvement, it is ambiguous about developmental experiences that are informed by state 
intrusion. Singh demonstrates that the post-War East Asian economic history 
unquestionably revealed a case for adopting an industrial strategy that guided the market, 
and not market friendly approach as enunciated by the World Bank reports. 
Chapter 5 
5.0 Industrial policy and the developing economies 
5.2.1 Introduction 
The market outcomes depend on the participation, and the exchange of goods and services 
through markets. The structure of the economy does not only have to do with the 
endowments of countries, but also of groups and institutions, which enable them to 
participate in market exchange. And powerful groups and institutions shape markets, and 
influences what can be exchanged and on what terms. In turn, size and positions in trade 
are important for the relationship between industrial structures and market outcomes. The 
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choice and design of policies, institutions and economic structures are reflected in the 
ability to participate competitively in global trade. 
5.2.2 New Structural Economics and Africa‟s industrialisation 
According to Justin Lin, Ann Harrison and Lixin Xu (2011), Africa’s policies program 
should focus on exploiting its latent comparative advantage in select light manufacturing 
industries, particularly in agricultural processing, garments and leather products. The 
assumption is that these industries could initiate rapid productivity, exports and create 
employment opportunities. Furthermore, the anticipated China’s ―diminishing‖ cost 
advantage, which is linked with rising wages and non-wage labour costs, will allow Africa 
to fill in that space, and possibly lifting majority out of poverty, like China did.  
For Lin et al, one of the explanations of Africa’s poor performance relative to other fairly 
successful developing economies is ―firm size, infrastructure, government expropriation, 
crime, and the access to informal finance‖. They further suggest that Africa’s conditional 
advantage is ―higher in low-tech than in high-tech manufacturing, in small than in large 
and medium firms, suggesting that Africa may have comparative advantage in simple light 
industries‖. To buttress the point, Monga (2011) reasons that ―…country with abundant 
labour or natural resources and scarce capital will have comparative advantage and be 
competitive in labour or resource-intensive industries. Similarly, a high-income country 
with abundant capital and scarce labour will have comparative advantage and be 
competitive in capital-intensive industries.‖ Implicit in this assertion is that a country 
endowed with abundant labour and other resources has to heavily rely on importing 
capital, which delays its capital accumulation for its development. 
On the contrary, Christopher Chase-Dunn and Peter Grimes (1995) describes the 
prevailing world-system as characterised by power-hierarchy relation between developed, 
powerful and wealthy core societies and the less developed, weak impoverished periphery 
societies. A significant factor in the positioning of a region in the core or the periphery is 
technology. If that be the case, Africa reliance on low technology is more of a weakness 
than a conditional advantage. Currently, Africa is structurally constrained to experience a 
kind of development that reproduces its subordinate status owing to resource-dependency. 
According the world-system theory ―The transfer or exchange of economic surplus is the 
fundamental criterion of a world systemic relationship…‖  
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Furthermore, as Celestin Monga, (2011) notes ―Over the long term, productivity growth is 
associated with technological and structural change, namely, to reduce the costs of 
producing the same outputs with better knowledge and to relocate resources from lower 
value-added to higher value-added industries‖. From this theoretical construct, the 
hegemonic relations between highly technological and industrialised societies and 
technologically impoverished is constantly maintained and enforce to preserve free 
unequal trade exchange as long as it is to the advantage of the former. Fundamentally, the 
capitalist world-economy rewards accumulated capital, at a higher rate than mere 
availability of abundance of factor production, namely, labour, and the geographical 
maldistribution of these occupational skills involves a strong trend toward self-
maintenance, and the division of a world-economy involves a hierarchy of occupational 
tasks, in which tasks requiring higher levels of skill and greater capitalisation are reserved 
for already technologically advanced world-locations.  
The forces of the marketplace have shown to reinforce rather than undermine them. 
According to United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (―UNIDO‖) report 
(2009), Africa has experienced insignificant structural change in its export bundle. The 
export bundle mainly comprised of low levels of manufactured exports and the utilisation 
of almost obsolete technology in marginal manufacturing sectors, even agricultural-led 
industrialisation is constrained because of the lack of technological innovation in 
agriculture. The markedly improved economic performance between 1994 and 2008, 
which averaged approximately to 5% (per cent) per year showed little evidence to suggest 
that significant changes in structural variables underpinned it, John Page (2011). Page 
further explains that the structural change deficit was caused by lack of diversification and 
sophistication in the manufactured goods as with specialisation in a relatively narrow 
range of economic activities. He cites empirical studies that found a strong, positive 
correlation between the level of sophistication of a country’s industrial production and 
export structure and its subsequent growth. These studies showed that the degree of 
product sophistication is positively related to a high income due to product added-value. 
The added-value products requires more than product sophistication, but also introduction 
of new product lines and addition of new economic activities in existing sectors to achieve 
high levels of income.  
Meanwhile, Lin et al (2011) emphasises Africa’s comparative advantages in many sub-
sectors of agriculture, livestock, and forestry. Their report recommends these as strengths 
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and foundation for policy initiatives to kick-start light manufacturing industries. It also 
insists on the use of abundant inputs to create much needed non-farm employment, expand 
foreign exchange earnings potential, export expansion to increase the demand for crops, 
animal products, timber, and other low-cost sectors with ample scope for future production 
increases. The assumption is that such initiatives hold the promise of sparking an upward 
spiral of growth, structural transformation, productivity, employment, and penetration of 
global markets. However, Thomas Lines (2006) argues that the agricultural and animal 
products are vulnerable to pests and diseases, and their yields are subject to natural forces 
in a way that affects few other products. Above all, these variables influences on supply 
cannot be easily predicted. Moreover, prices of manufactured exports are less volatile and 
less susceptible to long-term deterioration than those of primary goods, such as raw 
minerals, crops and animal products, making manufacturing particularly strategic in highly 
commodity-dependent developing countries.  
The overproduction of agricultural and animal products for export markets has been 
encouraged through export orientation strategies advocated by the World Bank and other 
donors since the 1980’s. The countries exporting to the same markets and heeding the 
same advice, cause increase in total supply, leading to a fall in prices in which all would be 
worse off. Basically, any sudden shortages or surpluses on the market would have 
inevitable effects on price. Even worse, the futures exchanges markets and hedging 
activities facilitate speculative business since the speculators only buy or sell a ―paper’’ 
contract and are not obliged to store the material themselves, nor are they required to put 
up more than a small share of the full price, Robert Pollin (1997).  
Certainly, industrial production creates job opportunities at higher skill levels, facilitates 
deeper links across the services, agricultural, and capital goods industries, including 
between rural and urban economies. Chalmers Johnson's (1984) maintains that industrial 
policy refers to the ―concern with the structure of domestic industry and with promoting 
the structure that enhances the nation's industrial competitiveness.‖ Essentially, the 
primary goal of industrial policy is the transformation of the economy’s productive 
structure from low to high level. This means the use of production factors for something 
that was not manufactured previously. 
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5.2.3 African case studies: Zambia, Ethiopia and Tanzania 
A recent comparative study conducted by Dinh Hinh Dinh, Vincent Palmade, Vandana 
Chandra and Frances Cossar (2012) examined the economic performance of five 
economies, two Asian (China and Vietnam), three African (Ethiopia, Tanzania and 
Zambia). Predictably, it reveals a dismal performance of Africa’s structural adjustment 
relative to Asian countries. China is considered an emerging economic power, Vietnam as 
an economy in ―transition out of agriculture‖, while the economies of other African 
countries’ industrial sectors are less advance and minerals-dependent and chiefly agrarian. 
For instance, Ethiopia’s output structure, which is the bigger of the two, still remains 
―typical of a poorer developing economy in early transition‖, as agriculture accounts for 
44% percent, industry 13%, manufacturing 5% and services 42%. 
It essentially shows that the effects of global recession affected African exports of minerals 
and manufactured goods, especially textiles and leather, thus government revenue 
collection. While agro-processing such as coffee, cotton and flori-culture also suffered 
from low prices and weak export demand. The marginally ―diversified‖ exports of non-
traditional export are still dependent largely on primary products, and remains highly 
vulnerable to fluctuations in the prices of these minerals. These findings validate the 
argument since advanced Prebisch-Singer proposition (1950) that the decline in relative 
prices of primary commodities is largely structural, and the demand for these commodities 
is inelastic while that of manufactured goods was elastic.  
Furthermore, the declining prices is induced through interaction of inelastic demand with a 
supply position that could be highly variable due to natural endowment, as well as the 
tendency for price increases to generate over-investment in those primary commodities. 
This simply shows that the challenge facing Africa is to transform its economy from a 
resource-dependent one to a dynamic, diversified industrial economy. The resource 
dependency of African economies will not harness its comparative advantage by heavily 
depending on global trading on largely commodity-based products. To convert its 
comparative advantages into competitiveness requires deliberate planning to transform the 
structural production pattern of their economies and ensure a solid manufacturing base, 
DPR Debate, Lin and Monga, 2011.  
Dani Rodrik and Margaret McMillan (2011), argue that recent researches show that there 
are significant differentials between sectors of modern economic activities such as 
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manufacturing. The advantage is that if labour and other resources are transferred from 
unproductive to more productive activities, the economy grows even if there is no 
productivity growth within sectors. This type of growth-enhancing structural change plays 
a critical impetus that contribute to overall economic growth, as high-growth countries are 
typically those that have underwent substantial growth-enhancing structural change. 
Lin et al (ibid, 2011) predict that China’s development will cause a movement up to high-
end, value-added chain of manufacturing, thus creating opportunities for Africa to locate 
up within value-chain of light manufacturing and related industries. This is untenable. 
Robert Wade (2010) explains that many developing countries are ensnared into what is 
called a ―middle-technology trap‖, where their firms are caught in the relatively low value-
added segments of global production chains, unable to break into innovation-intensive 
production. This underlines the idea that the world economy is not an open-ended system 
in which all can raise their long-term growth rate and reduce the gap with the industrialised 
countries if they ―get their prices‖ and ―governance right‖. Similarly, the supply-chain 
industrialisation, may lead to fast growth, but it could have limited spill overs, because it 
comes with the risk of further relocations of production. Therefore, a special attention 
should be paid to the fickleness of production fragmentation.  
Research by Business Monitor International (2012) suggests that any slowdown in China’s 
economy due to on-going global recession and its transition to a more domestic 
consumption-based economy, will depress demand for African exports. Less investment in 
industry and more consumption in China mean structurally lower demand for raw 
materials and more for consumption goods. Disconsolately, Africa does not make any 
consumption goods outside of food exports, so this opportunity will likely accrue to other 
developing economies.  The report further declares that Africa’s exporters of industrial 
metals are heavily exposed to China’s construction sector, and fall in export demand will 
be significantly felt. Thus, Africa’s dependence on commodity exports makes it more 
susceptible and less well-suited to adapt to a consumer-focused China than many other 
emerging markets, thus exports will falter, perhaps less so as an energy-source  such as oil. 
This scenario interestingly shows that for African economies to avoid global trade 
marginalisation their development requires non-marginal change that market forces alone 
could not generate nor sustain. It is only through targeted public policy interventions and 
the commensurate public and private investments that Africa can begin to raise 
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manufacturing output and increase its share of global trade and production. A strong 
manufacturing sector boosted by intellectual capital and innovation, driving growth in 
demand for skilled workers. Africa’s past trade indicator record shows that its growth has 
mainly been underpinned by the commodities' boom and the rise of service industries on 
the back of products not produced in Africa. A genuine and sustainable growth had to be 
rooted in manufacturing and adding value to the products Africa is endowed with. 
5.2.4 South Africa‟s industrial policy 
South Africa’s industrial policy has largely been driven by the development of the 
economy around the minerals and energy sectors and associated interests, known as the 
minerals energy complex, (―MEC‖). The industrial support is at the same time selective 
and broad, and a combination of pro-market and state-driven policies. The selective 
protection is targeted at some of the consumer goods sectors such as motor vehicles, 
textiles, clothing through extensive tariffs, quotas and subsidies whilst the broader 
economic measures supported the needs of the dominant capital-intensive industry. There 
seems to be continuity in the economic structures and the dominance of MEC with the 
shift largely in rhetorical, which is indicative of poor manufacturing performance and 
increasing unemployment that has plagued the economy since the 1980's. South Africa’s 
key industrialisation challenge like other developing economies is to grow and diversify 
manufacturing and tradable services.  
Chang (1996) avers that South Africa’s industrial policy orientation has changed from a 
demand-side to a supply-side industrial promotion with the end of the apartheid, yet 
guaranteeing domestic demand alone is hardly enough to get a viable successful infant 
industry. Certainly, global and domestic economic factors affect a country's industrial 
performance, some factors might be beyond the scope of industrial policy such as global 
business cycle, domestic macroeconomic policy, and the education and training system. 
Significantly, skills, and research capabilities are necessary for effective industrial 
upgrading. Chang suggests that industrialisation and diversification should not allow 
restricting South Africa’s development path to its comparative natural-resource advantage, 
they have to intervene selectively to build competitive advantages in a range of other 
industries. 
For Chang the fact that South Africa is earning high levels of resource rents from its 
resource endowments does not mean that the only way forward is to upgrade into 
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industries related to such natural resources. Also Robert Wade (2010) demonstrates 
evidence of how East Asian industrial policy comprised two types of market approaches, 
―leading the market‖ and ―following the market‖. A classic example of leading the market 
industrial policy initiative being Posco, the Korean integrated steel firm, which the World 
Bank advised the Korean government not to undertake on the grounds that Korea had no 
comparative advantage in steel. The success of industrial policy anywhere in the world is 
dependent on adequate administrative and institutional capabilities to achieve the 
pronounced policy objectives and appropriate coordination between industrial policy and 
other related economic policies. 
5.2. 5 Impact of technological development on industrial policy 
According to Banji Oyeyinka-Oyelaran (1998), technological society is distinguished from 
previous epochs by the emergence of the extensive and systematic use of new techniques 
and production processes. The technological systems have developed into a highly 
organised one for research and deliberate technological innovation coupled with extensive 
and complex information processing system. Kim Linsu (2000) posits that technological 
capability refers to the ability to make effective use of technological knowledge in 
production, engineering and innovation to sustain competitiveness. He further suggests 
that such capability should enable the domestic firms to assimilate, use, adapt and alter 
existing technologies.  
Although the drive to develop technological capabilities comes from firms themselves, 
public institutions still have a supporting role to play. The mechanics of international trade 
reveals that domestic firms cannot depend on imported technologies alone, they must have 
a foundation of internal capability. Technology acquisition and domestic learning efforts, 
both inside firms and within public institutions, are therefore complementary processes, 
not substitutes for each other. Most firms in developing countries rely on imported 
equipment, knowledge, information and software as part of their capability development 
strategies. This process is commonly referred to as ―technology transfer‖, which should 
not be misconstrued to imply a passive role on the part of importing firms. As Arrow 
pointed out (1962), ―one learns by doing and one learns how to learn by learning‖ [Stiglitz 
1987, cited by Arrow].  
Incontestably, training and skills development are crucial for country to enhance its 
economic efficiency, boost GDP growth, and achieve poverty alleviation and improved 
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general welfare. The inter-linkages between skills and competitiveness should be the focus 
of the structurally innovative production economy. In a global trade, technologies and 
modes of production are in a perpetual state of change. Today's scarce skill and innovative 
technology may be redundant in a few years, depending on new technological advances. 
Lin (2011) contends that the developing economies can easily purchase new technological 
products and services in the global technological market. He suggests that instead of 
attempting to enter ―technological frontiers‖, they should focus on economic activities that 
are informed by abundance of their factor endowments. Granted it is available to all 
countries, but it is not indiscriminately accessible owing to barriers to adoption.  
For instance, limitations imposed by geographically dispersed and dis-integrated 
production systems as result of ―compressed development‖, Hugh Whittaker (2008), 
serves as a major constraint. Moudud Jamee and Botchway Karl (2007) subliminally 
underscore that vertical dis-integration and geographical dispersal of production processes 
by trans-national corporations (―TNCs‖) is not a guarantee of making available innovative 
technology invested in particular country, because TNCs situate each process of 
production in different locations to benefit from individual country’s readily available 
cheap labour pool and other reduced factor inputs. Moreover, the present World Trade 
Organisation (―WTO‖) agenda allows limited manoeuvre for selective protection of 
industry, including its coercive trade regime to liberalise domestic market for products, 
services and investments. This means that there is no simple approach to the question of 
how accessible is new technology in a global market to ensure that it combines with the 
right skills best to serve the economic needs of the country. 
Therefore, the assumption that domestic firms will somehow and someday in future 
instantaneously upgrade their technology, and become globally competitive is practically 
suspect. In addition, Robert Wade (2010) argues that the reliance on multinationals 
typically produces an import-intensive industrialisation in developing economies. The 
exports of natural resource processing industries, foodstuffs and primary commodities 
grows fast, while imports of capital goods and intermediate goods grown even faster. This 
pattern of industrialisation-led growth causes a rapid increase in economic concentration, 
as small and medium enterprises which had earlier supplied big national firms are 
marginalised by imports. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
Certainly, it is not easy to have a practical execution of the industrial policy, particularly 
without government’s intervention. There is ample empirical evidence of other economies 
that have been remarkably successful with prudent state involvement in advancing 
economic development and structural transformation. Given the nature and scope of 
industrial challenges of most developing economies, there is compelling argument to have 
an influential and capable state that underpins industrial policy, remedying any 
institutional and structural rigidity to allow socially acceptable economic development. 
Economic reality is that economic theories evolve through not only rational innovation, but 
ideological assumptions as well as external historical influences. The historical 
circumstances in which theories occur are very unique and specific to a historical epoch. 
Accordingly, this greatly affects particular position of a country in the prevailing power 
relations of the world economy.  
Lin’s New Structural Economics is an imperative work of development policy, yet an 
ambitious and contentious one. It endeavours to provide an alternative to the now 
discredited Washington Consensus policies that guided the BWIs for years. In summary, 
Lin’s new structural economics argues that the best way to upgrade a country’s 
endowment structure is to develop its industries according to the comparative advantages 
determined by its given endowment structure at that time. The NSE could be viewed as a 
milder version of economic structuralism, an approach from the 1960-70s, but a step closer 
to the ―Washington Consensus‖ as it affirms that markets are basic determinant for 
effective resource allocation at each level of development.  
Therefore, implicit in the assertion is that governments must ―follow‖ markets, not ―lead‖ 
them if ever they hope to succeed. The propositions of strictly conforming to comparative 
advantages and allowing unfettered market forces denies developing economies an 
acceptable scope to successfully industrially upgrade. Certainly, the international policy 
environment today imposes constraints on the use of national policies that were absent 
even thirty years ago and the constraints are backed up by the potent dispute settlement 
procedure of the WTO. Furthermore, globalisation in its current form and its fiercely 
competitive open trade serves the interests of the industrialised economies. Thus, ensuring 
dominance of global markets for their products and frustrating developing economies 
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efforts to ―catch-up‖. What is instructive is that successful industrialisation cannot be 
attained through mere competitive markets or state support of just removing binding 
constraints. Critical factors such as capital, technology and entrepreneurship are necessary, 
which are unlikely to emerge from the market forces alone. The inherent features of 
commodity markets, which are peculiar to emerging economies can prevent demand, 
supply and price signals from interacting with any degree of efficiency. Therefore, the 
state is bound to intervene either way. Market economics remain dominant even as the 
socio-economic effects of globalisation of unemployment and income inequality and 
financial deregulation wreaks havoc in the developed world. Though economic 
perspectives will inevitably shift as emerging economies demand alternative capable 
economic perspectives that will partner market efficiency to develop a humane global 
economic future. 
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